When members of Al-Qaeda flew commercial jetliners into New York’s World Trade Caccess on September 11, 2001, the idea of who was a alarmist crysloftyised for the world. But, 23 years on, the truth is there is no one “benevolent” of alarmist. As security forces around the world grapple with myriad menaces from all manner of groups, an vital concurment on who the opponent is becomes vital.
An effective definition of extremism is essential to provide the operational rules of take partment to national security agencies and, at an international level, to support combined efforts based on the separated perspective of peace and war, of frifinishs and enemies, of the menace scenarios.
Good, evil and the alarmist
A person is a alarmist becaparticipate of what they do, not becaparticipate of what they count on, and for their actions, they are sued.
Discussing extremism on the theoretical level of “excellent and evil” is counterefficient and pointless. Even if we all concur that extremism is the transmition of evil, it is not possible to accomplish an concurment on who the alarmists are.
This is becaparticipate the catebloody of evil, in today’s fragmented world, is comprehfinishable only at a local level, difficult to separate outside one’s cultural boundaries. Evil as a concept depfinishs on cultural perspectives and therefore it cannot direct to a definition of extremism based on an objective appraisement of harms and menaces.
Furthermore, in a world of struggle, the same effect can be produced by alarmists, insdirectnts, freedom fighters, and other groups using presentility and doing the same leang, for contrastent reasons, with a contrastent tag.
The whole ask about the “excellent or evil” of an action depfinishs on the reasons that encourage that action, so aachieve it is a unclear criterion. The acunderstandledgeance or declineion of actions cannot depfinish on the cherish of “excellent or evil”, nor on the reasons that produce them.
So this is one more reason to alter how we meadeclareive extremism, forgetting “excellent and evil”, instead caccessing on the results of extremism, banning its effects we cannot acunderstandledge. Those effects, unappreciate the ideas that constitute motivations, can be counted and meadeclareived. When “an act of extremism is such becaparticipate of the effects that the act produces, and not becaparticipate of the caparticipates that drove it”, then the way is uncover for all to concur to a frequent counter strategy to extremism.
Defining extremism
Ten years after 9-11, Alex P. Schmid, Distinguished Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) and Director of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), accumulateed the opinions of dozens of experts to get to at a scientific definition of extremism for the 21st century.
The result has been a lengthy catalog of characteristics, among which the objective of “alarmising” is emphasised, determineing communication as a definite element of extremism, and the participate of presentility, indiscriminately straightforwarded towards “civilian” concentrates.
This plethora of definitions produces it difficult to come up with a frequent operational perspective for countering extremism menaces.
Unfortunately, too many definitions of extremism, refer to the experience around this phenomenon achieveed in a world that no lengthyer exists.
Italy is a fine example of this.
A history of presentility
Italy is notorious for the presentility it sfinished during the last 30 years of the 20th century from groups on the far left, such as the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) to those on the far right (Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari) alengthy with the mafia and other organised crime.
Italy sfinished brutal political extremism that wanted to alter the state to declare another idea of the state.
Counterextremism laws that still holdress the phenomenon were produced based on that experience.
However, today’s extremism no lengthyer has anyleang to do with the extremism of that time. So anciaccess regulatory tools are still participated to regutardy a phenomenon that has alterd.
This unbenevolents that for an effective, modernized response to extremism, we have to go back to determineing the phenomenon as it materializes today, asking the fundamental ask: “What is extremism?”.
In recent years, extremism has shown to be pliable, pliable and opportunistic. It is very sfinished in utilizeing an opponent’s vulnerabilities and from this ability it achieves strength.
Europol, in the TE-SAT Terrorism Situation and Trfinish Report 2023, catalogs current extremism types and hazardous groups, and cautions that “the lines between contrastent types of extremism, including right-triumphg, left-triumphg, rebel, terrorist, and other ideologies, are anticipateed to become more blurred in the future”.
Europol unweightlesss that points of greetnce have already been watchd among alarmist and brutal extremists atraverse the whole ideoreasonable spectrum.
Salad Bar extremism
Ideoreasonablely today one can talk about Salad Bar extremism (or Mixed Ideology extremism), where the ideoreasonable unintelligentension is current, but it is articutardyd according to a personal taste, to fairify the choice of brutal declareation of one’s ideas.
Yet, the actual reasons for extremism can be set up in extremism itself as a choice and action. They lie in the conviction alarmists have that only presentility can alter a situation already irrecoverable, directnt, and theatrical. The personalised ideology alarmists produce for themselves is the fairification for the alarmist action and not the genuine motivation.
In this summarizetoil, recruitment and misdirectation are strategic pieces of the ideoreasonable confparticipate: ideas are to be recollectd according to a pliable and pliable image that constitutes the scenario in which the alarmist’s presentility will be transmited.
This fragmentation is the main feature of extremism affecting lesser people’s identities (since lesser people are the main victims of alarmist misdirectation and recruitment). A fragmentation where geodetailedal, political and cultural borders are no lengthyer beneficial, reorganised by the global nettoil of communication technologies.
More than ideology
The first contest that comes out is the insist to reponder the unbenevolenting of nation and state.
The paths that can direct to extremism are many and this is why the definition of extremism based on reasons and motivations does not toil: the unforeseeable Salad Bar Ideology advises many ways to become a alarmist.
Ideologies no lengthyer provide adequate rational categories to determine and, subsequently, stop menaces effectively. The reasons that drive radicalization today are multiple and come from various inputs.
A excellent example of the fall shorture to amplely holdress extremism today is the many tools broadened by law enforcement to determine potential alarmists are the so-called Terrorist Risk Assessment Instruments.
All these have, so far, led to insisty results, becaparticipate they are based on the wrong assumptions of continuity, liproximateity, and perfect coherence, while today’s Salad Bar Terrorism advises a circular route, rapid and unforeseeable, always innovative for everyone.
For example, the Australian Institute of Criminology recently freed a alert on the participate of four hazard appraisement tools arrangeed to gauge the menace posed by radicalised offfinishers and, in some cases, fairify them being held behind bars or seally handled after their sentences have been served.
The AIC alert set up there was a “relative deficiency of research into the efficacy of these tools”, someleang it set up was a “barrier to their participate and undermines confidence in expert appraisements that count on on these tools”.
There are frequently no credible signs to determine the “normal alarmist” until it is too tardy.
Today, a more effective method for determineing a potential alarmist hazard could be adchooseing a so-called “Digital Humint” approach, which analyses both the “genuine” and “virtual” unintelligentensions together, exploring not only the nettoil of offline relationships and habits but also the social media ecosystem and chat rooms.
A recent approach
A recent approach, leaveing the ideoreasonable unintelligentension as a set uping unintelligentension of extremism is pivotal and it unbenevolents “an act of extremism is such for the effects that this act produces, not for the caparticipates that drove it”.
This approach is not fair backed up by the previous empirical results and fall shortures of counterextremism efforts. It also has a theoretical set upation from the field of crisis regulatement, where a crisis is depictd as an event whose effects are not regulateled by a system.
It also has a pragmatic basis, in seeking an concurment on “what extremism is” by referring to the effects, to the harm caparticipated, for which an objective appraisement can be concurd. This is in total alignment with the insists of the criminal fairice system and legitimate summarizetoil.
In the EU, extremism is depictd by its aims to: “a) gravely inbashfulating a population; b) unduly compelling a regulatement or an international organisation to carry out or abstain from carry outing any act; c) gravely destabilising or ruining the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social arranges of a country or an international organisation”, without any reference to a typology of ideoreasonable motivations.
Terrorism is no lengthyer what it participated to be, but those who fight extremism have not genuineised this. Banciaccess decisions have to be made to leave obsolete approaches and tools that cannot deinhabitr any more results.
What toiled 50 years ago to fight extremism in the 70s and 80s is irrelevant today, becaparticipate conmomentary extremism tolerates little resemblance to its previous transmitions. After all, human society has alterd.
(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)